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I. Introduction 
The impetus of the one-hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War of 
1914-18 has provided opportunities for the re-evaluation of both historical understanding of 
the war, and of its commemoration and remembrance.
 1
 With the deaths of the last war 
veterans, the war must be understood in terms of remembrance rather than of memory, as 
well as in terms of its history. As fresh findings have emerged from the investigation of 
historical evidence, so the history of the war has been greatly modified, and these new 
historical findings have begun to impact on the approach to the study of remembrance. The 
last decade (or so) of historical research has been characterised by a new openness and new 
approaches, as well as fresh controversies. These have included several recent publications on 
the war’s origins and outbreak, on its conduct in both military and social terms, and on its 
aftermath. In many areas of research, old assumptions and national or regional histories, and 
narrower methodological approaches, are being replaced by the beginnings of a real global 
history for what was truly a world war. 
 
II. A Great Global War 
There is no single perspective on the history of the First World War that could ever embrace 
the entire war and all its consequences.
 
The discussion of the historical understanding and 
commemoration of the war in this paper has been shaped by the choices made in placing it 
within the context of British and German cultures of remembrance a hundred years after the 
war’s outbreak. This anniversary has also provided an opportunity to reflect on how much 
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our wider knowledge of that terrible war has increased in recent years. It is popularly 
assumed that knowledge fades over time, as personal memory becomes scarcer and more 
remote. But for an event as large as the First World War the opposite has proved to be true, 
largely in consequence of the release and uncovering of new evidence. As historians, we 
know considerably more about the war than was known fifty years ago, and certainly far 
more than any one individual did at the time, except perhaps about their own immediate 
personal experience. But as a reflection of the choices in perspective that we must make as 
historians, there is scarcely a word in common between this present paper and a paper that I 
contributed in 2008 to a conference and book sponsored by the Australian War Memorial to 
mark the ninetieth anniversary of the end of the war.
2
 That paper stressed the wartime 
contributions of the countries of the British Empire, and the truly revolutionary changes in 
our recent understanding of the military history of the war, particularly the tactical and 
technological developments of the Western Front, that led to the Allied victory. This present 
paper, intended chiefly for a German and wider European (including British) readership, 
reflects more the political, social and cultural aspects of the war; and inevitably the war’s 
outbreak rather than its ending. This includes the contribution to the present historical debates 
of historians who are of German birth or origin, but who have found their intellectual homes 
in Britain or other parts of the English-speaking world. It also reflects the importance given to 
studying the history of Germany in the first half of the 20th Century, especially the First and 
Second World Wars, by a strong and distinguished group of British historians who, beginning 
their careers in the 1960s with the implications of the ‘Fischer Thesis’, have challenged the 
idea of the German ‘special path’ (Sonderweg), and tackled the ‘big questions’ of recent 
German history.
3
 In my own career as a historian, which has embraced both the military and 
the cultural history of warfare, including much work on the First World War, I am pleased to 
have the opportunity to summarise this new knowledge. 
Even so, this was truly a global war, and it needs an even more far reaching approach 
to its history to encompass it. After decades of European emigration to the rest of the world, 
the First World War caused a brief reversal of this trend, with unexpected and sometimes 
lasting consequences. There are many illustrations of this: Japanese sailors in 1917 walked 
the streets of Malta; while Germans in France found themselves fighting – among many other 
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nationalities – at first Sikhs from the Punjab and Ghurkhas from Nepal, and then later on 
fighting Americans from Wisconsin, a state that in 1910 had a majority who spoke German as 
their first language. Although on the Western Front the war ended at 11.00 a.m. (British time) 
on 11 November 1918, the fighting did not. What may be called the ‘aftershock wars’ or 
‘successor wars’ to the First World War continued in regions as diverse as Mesopotamia, 
Ukraine and Ireland well into the 1920s. How to expand the scope of the history of the First 
World War was shown at the turn of the millennium by the monumental collaboration 
between German and American scholars studying the nature of total war, orchestrated by the 
German Historical Institute in London.
4
 Only a decade later, the sheer breadth and depth of 
the current approaches to the First World War has been well illustrated by the publication in 
2014 (in English and French) of the new three-volume Cambridge History of the First World 
War, edited by Jay Winter.
5
 This encompassed the work of scholars of many nationalities, 
ranging across all countries and cultures affected, from narratives and theatres of war through 
to the broader role of the state at war, and the role of civil society including the war’s 
aftermath and memorialisation. 
 
III. Cultures of Remembrance  
The centenary anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War has been a particularly 
piquant challenge, which the British have taken extremely seriously. In October 2012, at the 
main London site of the Imperial War Museums, Prime Minister David Cameron announced 
plans for an extensive British official commemoration programme for the First World War 
which has now started, and which is intended to last until the end of 2018.
6
 For the British 
(and for most English-speakers), and in contrast to the rest of Europe except for Belgium, it 
has always been the First World War rather than the Second World War which was the great 
tragic event of the 20th Century. The central paradox of the British experience of the First 
World War is that the war enjoyed massive popular support from the British civilian 
                                                          
4
 The proceedings of successive conferences have been published: Stig Förster and Jorg Nagler: On the Road to 
Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871. Cambridge 1997; 
Manfred F. Boemeker and Stig Förster (eds): Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 
1871-1914. Cambridge 1999; Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds): Great War, Total War: Combat and 
Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918. Cambridge 2000; Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds): The 
Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919-1939. Cambridge 2003; Roger 
Chickering and Stig Förster (eds): A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937-
1945. Cambridge 2004.  
5
 Jay Winter (ed.): The Cambridge History of the First World War, 3 volumes Cambridge 2014). / La Première 
Guerre Mondiale. 3 volumes Paris 2013-14. 
6
 Speech by Prime Minister the Rt. Hon David Cameron, at the Imperial War Museum, London, 11 October 
2012, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-at-imperial-war-museum-on-first-world-
war-centenary-plans 
4 
 
population from start to finish, and also largely from the populations of the British Empire; 
Great Britain also emerged from the war as a victor, with its territory largely unaffected, its 
empire at its greatest historical extent, and with its war dead – both in absolute and 
proportionate terms – fewer than those of France, Germany or even Italy. Despite its financial 
losses, Great Britain might even have been a net creditor from the war, if the emerging Soviet 
Union had not reneged on all the Russian Empire’s debts. But more than any other major 
power, Great Britain then almost immediately turned against the idea of war as a future 
instrument of policy, so that by the early 1920s it had become impossible for any British 
mainstream politician to seriously advocate deliberately embarking on a war as a 
praiseworthy act. This phenomenon is now explained partly by Britain being largely a 
satisfied power in the aftermath of the war, at least in terms of its international security, and 
also by the extreme cultural shock to a country unused to peacetime conscription, and 
afterwards deeply disturbed both by what it had needed to do to win, and by what the 
consequences of another major European war might be. British commemoration of the First 
World War has always been first and foremost about the dead: at once its most personal and 
the most nationally and publically visible aspect.  
A century after the event, a sizeable majority of British people wish to see the First 
World War commemorated, and mostly they wish this commemoration to be about the dead, 
and about the war’s consequences for their lives today. What are for many historians the 
more important questions about the war – how and why it was fought, and how and why it 
was won – attract less British public interest. There is also a considerable British concern to 
avoid triumphalism. It was only with difficulty that historians have persuaded the British 
government to include a centenary commemoration of the Battle of Amiens of August 1918, 
General Erich Ludendorff’s famous ‘black day of the German Army’ and as good a marker as 
any for the moment at which the war was lost and won, alongside commemorations of British 
defeats or heavy losses, such as the Battle of the Somme in 1916 or the Third Battle of Ypres 
(usually known to the British as Passchendaele) in 1917.
7
 In present day remembrance, it is 
fundamental to the foundation myth of the European Union that the three great Franco-
German conflicts – the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the First World War of 1914-18 and 
the Second World War of 1939-45 – should be seen as European civil wars, in which all 
Europe and its civilisation was the loser, and in which any discussion of victory is therefore 
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meaningless. This sits well with the perspectives of present-day Great Britain, a multicultural 
and diverse modern state for which the values of the British Empire of 1914-18 are very 
remote indeed. But it does not sit well with the myth of a unified and victorious Great Britain 
in the First World War, or with the importance of the wider British Empire to that victory. It 
is particularly hard to reconcile the idea of the First World War as a European civil war with 
the cultural perspectives of present-day Canada, Australia and India. For the various 
successor states of the British Empire and their governments, responses have been as diverse 
as their geographical and cultural spread. Probably no country is placing more importance on 
the centenary commemorations than Australia, which for decades has seen the First World 
War as central to its own defining national foundation myth. The responses from countries 
such as India and Canada have so far been rather more ambiguous. It has also proved hard to 
reconcile this narrative with the historical traditions formed in the old pre-unification German 
Democratic Republic, which like the Soviet Union took the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 as 
the defining event that separated the Great War 1914-17 from the subsequent revolutionary 
wars 1917-1922.        
The impact of the First World War at the time on British society was so considerable 
that national government plans for commemoration of the war began in Great Britain before 
the war itself had actually ended, in 1917 with the establishment of the Imperial (later 
Commonwealth) War Graves Commission, and of the Imperial War Museum.
8
 The Museum 
began at once to collect and preserve documents and other evidence, including the world’s 
first national film archive, with particular attention paid to the role of British women in the 
war, and to the wider role of the British Empire. Commemorations of various kinds about the 
war have taken place ever since, and in recent decades cultural historians have produced a 
wealth of valuable studies on their forms and meanings. But for this centenary anniversary 
there are two important differences. First, the very last Frontkampfer, the veterans of the war, 
are dead; there is no longer any adult personal memory of the First World War, no matter 
how tenuous or controversial. Although as with the loss of nay human life this is perhaps a 
sad fact, it is not necessarily of great historical significance. Oral historians have long been 
aware of the doubtful value of personal memories at such a distance in time. But in today’s 
world it is only a collective cultural memory that remains, presenting the challenge that any 
collective memory will be at variance with some of the known facts about the war. In 
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essence, the study of commemorative cultures of war is the study of how people who are not 
historians have got their history wrong.  
The second great difference between the centenary anniversary and studies that 
historians have made of previous commemorations is that this time as historians we are inside 
the experiment, taking part in the commemoration. By perhaps early 2019, historians will 
have a first tentative knowledge of what has happened, and of what part historians have 
played in it. This is probably the one time in their lives that the present generation may think 
seriously about the First World War, and it represents a unique opportunity to push the 
boundaries of imagination and knowledge. In January 2013, Sir Hew Strachan, the only 
historian of the First World War on the British government’s advisory panel for its 
commemoration (a fact that in itself speaks volumes about the British approach) warned 
publicly that if the planned official commemoration ‘simply reworks the familiar themes of 
remembrance, it will be repetitive, sterile and possibly even boring. If we do not emerge at 
the end of the process in 2018 with fresh perspectives, we shall have failed’.9  
 
IV. The British ‘Two Western Fronts’ 
The origins of our present historical understanding of the First Word War may be traced back 
about fifty years to the 1960s, to when the generation that fought in the First World War 
began to die of old age, leaving behind an immense mass of letters, memoirs and other 
evidence, supplemented by the release into the public domain of large numbers of official 
documents relating to the war. In the British historical tradition, publications based on this 
new evidence have within recent decades rewritten much of the history of the war, from the 
politics and grand strategies of nations through to the tactics of the battlefields, and the 
attitudes and beliefs of the soldiers and civilians, replacing an older narrative based chiefly on 
published evidence consciously provided by elites. Known originally for convenience as the 
‘revisionist’ perspective (a term that has, of course, been used in many other cases, but has 
been particularly associated with new British views of the First World War) this approach to 
the British contribution to the war also coincided to a large extent with the shift in the 
understanding of Germany’s war aims begun with the work of Fritz Fischer. This British 
revisionism in turn has prompted historical investigation into a most unusual cultural 
phenomenon that is still with us. The 1960s was also the time of the great youth cultural 
revolution and its challenge to established values. In effect, it was a rejection by many of the 
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young of the values of their grandparents, and that meant the values and social assumptions 
with which the First World War had been fought. This led in Britain from the 1960s onwards 
to an interpretation of the experience of the war couched in terms of irony and rejection. If 
over the subsequent decades British historical revisionists have been arguing against 
anything, it has been against the position taken in Paul Fussell’s classic early work of cultural 
criticism The Great War and Modern Memory (1975), that the First World War had been 
such an exceptional and dislocating event that it could not be understood as history at all, but 
only through its elite literature. This debate has now largely run its course, and much of what 
was once revisionism may be now seen as orthodoxy among British historians. What remains 
a historical puzzle is how – and also when between the 1920 and the 1960s – the older elite 
interpretation of the First World War became almost universally accepted into wider modern 
British popular culture, to the extent that present-day public ‘remembrance’ of the war bears 
very little relation to its actual history. While this puzzle has been well explored by the work 
of Dan Todman and David Reynolds in particular, its implications for the very concept of any 
‘commemorative culture’ of the First World War are considerable.10 
It was in the 1990s that, among English-speaking historians, this new revisionist 
understanding of the First World War came into collision with the emerging work on the 
cultural history of the war coming from France and Germany. Whereas cultural historians 
stressed a ‘long war’ in the sense that the impact of the First World War may be considered to 
have never ended, along with the tragic nature of the conflict, the revisionists were concerned 
with the war in its own context and how it was perceived by people of the time. For cultural 
historians the war was a profound and enduring human tragedy, while the revisionists drew 
on evidence for contemporary mass public attitudes, and stressed the fact of a British (and 
Allied) victory. In the worst aspects of the ensuing debate, while cultural historians joined 
some political historians in emphasising the war’s global nature and complexity to the point 
of virtually neglecting the fighting, some revisionists became obsessed with military details 
down to artillery shell calibres. When cultural history drew on French postmodernist theory 
to discuss the war, many British revisionists, trained in a strong empiricist tradition, literally 
could not understand what they were saying. By the end of the decade the central problem to 
be overcome had been identified: most cultural historians and theorists took as their baseline 
the older view of the First World War, based on elite perspectives, that the new evidence 
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unearthed by the revisionists was simultaneously destroying. It was about this time that I 
characterised the debate in terms of their being ‘two Western Fronts’, to reflect the existence 
of a historical Western Front of the revisionists in contrast with the Western Front of the 
imagination of literary and cultural studies.
11
 The rifts between historians caused by this clash 
of ideas about the First World War were largely healed in 2007, very appropriately at the 
ninetieth anniversary conference of the Battle of Passchendaele held at Ypres Cloth Hall. It is 
now accepted that in order to understand the First World War we must approach its political 
and military history and its cultural or ‘long’ history as related perspectives rather than as 
separate, and with the same rigorous attention to facts and evidence.  
The impact of the cultural approach and of the importance of remembrance on 
mainstream political and military history of the First World War is now evident. It has 
become usual for major works on battles or on diplomacy to include a chapter or at least a 
discussion on the influence of cultural research findings, or the longer term imaginative and 
cultural results. By way of illustration, it is increasingly difficult to discuss British 
perspectives on the Battle of the Somme in 1916 without reference to the British official 
documentary propaganda film made at the time, also called Battle of the Somme, which 
smashed box-office records on its release and which is gradually becoming recognised as the 
essential starting point for any discussion of British civilian understanding of the Western 
Front at the time, and perhaps of popular understanding ever since. However, although 
cultural historians of the First World War have largely embraced its new military and 
political history, many scholars approaching the war from other disciplines, including 
literature and anthropology, still base their perspectives heavily on historical works that were 
classics of their time, but are now considerably out of date.
12
 
          
V. Evidence Gaps and Problems 
The war’s centenary has offered the chance to collect yet more evidence, this time across 
much of Western Europe, including Britain and Ireland, starting in 2008 with the work of the 
Oxford Digital Archive. In a simple and non-invasive process, people are presently being 
invited to come forward with their letters, diaries, medals, and other war memorabilia, not to 
donate them, but to loan them for a few minutes while they are digitally photographed and 
their provenance is recorded, with the resulting images to be placed on the web, often with 
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open access. Already, thousands of pieces of evidence have been recorded in this way. Many 
national and official archives are also making their material available on the web, including 
important film records made available through the European Film Gateway’s EFG 1914 
Project, which opened in 2014. Once again it will take decades to work through such a 
substantial increase in evidence, and the extent to which the material now being gathered will 
confirm or contradict our findings so far is one of the most exciting prospects for the future of 
First World War historical study. However, for every step forward there is also a step back. 
One of the continuing problems of First World War studies is that the best documented 
national war effort is also the most unusual: that of Great Britain with its massive navy, its 
improvised mass army, its homeland largely untouched by the fighting, and its unique global 
empire. It is an accepted feature of modern understanding of the First World War that the 
further east across Europe historians have looked, the more they have found higher 
proportionate casualties, greater levels of disruption and dislocation, and more cases of 
disregard for what were then established laws and conventions intended to mitigate the 
effects of war. To this should be added that the further eastwards historians look, the harder 
their work becomes in obtaining access to archives and evidence, and to establishing even the 
basic facts and events. The National Archives of Great Britain at Kew are well known for 
being a pleasure in which to work; and increasing digitisation of Australian and Canadian war 
records means that the distances from Europe are no longer always the obstacle that they 
were. To consult the French official records at Vincennes still sometimes requires immense 
patience. Research into the German conduct of the war has always been hampered by 
problems of evidence, including the loss of the Prussian Army’s records in 1945, although 
English-speaking historians are increasingly aware of the importance of the Bavarian Army’s 
records in Munich. There is a notorious lack of documentation relating to Austria-Hungary, 
while changing political circumstances have made access to historical records in Russia 
increasingly difficult. The war against the Ottoman Empire, with its continuing modern 
resonances remains under-researched, and even with immense goodwill on all sides there are 
many practical problems in accessing Ottoman records. Interest is increasing in the Indian 
Army of the British Raj, the largest all-volunteer army in modern history, recruited chiefly 
from what is now northern India and Pakistan, and which played the major role in the defeat 
of the Ottoman Empire; but important documents still remain inaccessible. In fact, there is 
still so much about the First World War that remains unknown, or on which the evidence may 
change, perhaps with the rediscovery of an underused archive or the chance opening of a 
10 
 
filing cabinet. We need to be less certain, and to hold our theories like a feather on the back 
of the hand; they are only our best assessment at the present time.  
It may be that major gaps in the archives and the evidence, in comparison with the 
detailed work of the last fifty years on Germany, France and Great Britain, have partly 
attracted some historians to make speculative claims about events further east, particularly in 
respect of the origins and outbreak of the war. While such theories may be conjectural or 
even wrong, it is important that they should be wrong in an interesting way. A bad historical 
theory or controversy will rapidly turn in upon itself, becoming a rather bad-tempered clash 
of unsubstantiated opinions, often about trivial or unprovable matters; a good theory or 
controversy is outward-looking and productive, forcing all historians back to the primary 
evidence and to an examination of the origins of the assumptions underpinning the existing 
orthodoxy. It is a trite observation that there has never been an absolute consensus on what or 
who caused the war, nor is there ever likely to be one. A recent and well-written summary 
briefly discusses eight main historical theories on the reasons for the war’s outbreak, and then 
dismisses all of them as unsatisfactory.
13
 But it has been both expected and encouraging that 
the war’s centenary has produced a number of new perspectives on its origins and outbreak, 
(even disregarding a number of conspiracy theories and books of little historical merit).  
The chief reasons for this lack of consensus lies partly in the events of the outbreak of 
the war themselves, and partly in the evidence available to us today. Both in July-August 
1914 and throughout the rest of the war, the governments of the major powers all went out of 
their way to deflect responsibility for its outbreak in public away from themselves. It was 
notably a major theme of German political calculation during the crisis of July-August 1914 
to attempt to emulate Bismarck’s success in appearing blameless over the outbreak of his war 
with France in 1870-71. In those countries with some form of mass representational politics, 
chiefly France, Britain and Germany (and in 1917 the United States) politicians felt it 
necessary to explain their country’s entry into the war to their people in simple terms: 
essentially that they were defending themselves. A fundamental long-term flaw in the 
German government’s position was the gap between its promise to its people that the war 
would be both short and defensive against an unprovoked attack by Russia, and its military 
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strategy of an immediate attack on Belgium and France, with the main propaganda enemy 
rapidly shifted to being Britain, and the promise of a short war unfulfilled.
14
  
Whatever ordinary people may have thought or told themselves in July-August 1914, 
none of the governments of the major powers were certain that this would be a short war, and 
the phrase ‘over by Christmas’ was never used by any high official, except possibly in hope 
or in irony. Although famously Kaiser Wilhelm II told his departing troops that they would 
be home ‘before the leaves fall from the trees’, this was not a statement agreed or cleared by 
his government. For France, it was not hard to explain the war to its people as defensive, but 
it was never promised to be short. The British government was quite open with its people 
about expecting a long war, and calling for volunteers for a mass army that could not be 
trained and ready for at least another year. Britain was not directly attacked, and the British 
cabinet was in July 1914 deeply divided about entry into the war. In recent years, French and 
German historians have successfully challenged the idea of mass war enthusiasm or crowds 
cheering for the war from its immediate outbreak, and the same findings have now been 
extended to Britain and to Ireland.
15
 Consequently, although the massive German violation of 
Belgian neutrality in early August had not been the chief consideration among Great Britain’s 
political decision-makers a week or so before, it was the event that united both the 
government and the people against what was seen as a real threat of future invasion, and 
made the British declaration of war certain. From start to finish, for the British people the war 
was about the German invasion and occupation of Belgium, and it was considered to have 
ended when Belgium was liberated. This also included the attitude of the British nation-in-
arms as represented by the British Army; in October 1918, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig 
(commanding the British Army on the Western Front) warned his government that his 
soldiers would not understand continuing the war further by invading Germany.  
This evidence points to what is arguably a significant methodological flaw that has 
marred several recent books on the outbreak of the war. With some exceptions, in their 
narratives political and diplomatic historians stop almost with the first shots in July-August 
1914, ignoring the next few months of the war’s conduct and its wider impact.16 This may 
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seem good international law, distinguishing ius ad bellum (the legality of entering into the 
war) from ius in bello (the legality of conduct during the war), but it is not good history. 
Little distinction could be made at the time between the war’s outbreak and its first crises, 
either by political leaders or by the mass of the people, and the declarations were followed at 
once by dramatic events which played an equally critical part in determining the war’s nature. 
One answer to the apparently hackneyed question as to what caused the First World War is 
that it was caused (in the sense that its nature was determined) by the discovery over the few 
months after its outbreak that it could not be fought and won by methods considered before 
July 1914. Put even more simply, the nature of the First World War was determined by the 
deadlock on the Western Front, and it ended only when that deadlock was broken; a fact that 
places German-Anglo-French military events squarely at the heart of the war’s discourse, as 
part of a wider re-integration of the military history of the war with its political and cultural 
history that has been a marked feature of recent historiography.  
 
VI. The Post-Fischer Consensus? 
Despite the impossibility of any absolute agreement by historians on the outbreak of the First 
World War, by the start of the new millennium there existed what Annika Mombauer has 
usefully described as the ‘post-Fischer consensus’, strengthened by newly available 
documentation and other evidence.
17
 This consensus represented a move away from the 
‘structural’ explanations for the start of the war that had developed in the 1920s and 1930s, 
and had remained tenable into the 1970s. In these explanations, all the major powers involved 
(and even minor powers, especially Serbia) bore responsibility for the outbreak of the war to 
some extent, but the main explanation lay in the existing political, economic and cultural 
undercurrents. The revelations of new evidence started by Fritz Fischer shifted this towards a 
variety of ‘contingent’ explanations, whereby one or more powers could be shown to have 
deliberately sought war in July 1914. Although there have always been proposals blaming 
Great Britain, Russia or France, the post-Fischer consensus among historians has been that 
the government (rather than the people), of Germany – and with increasing emphasis the 
government of Austria-Hungary – deliberately sought war, although in neither case was the 
war that they got the war that they had wanted or expected. The idea of the Sonderweg, of 
Imperial Germany’s attitudes towards the conduct of war both before and after 1914 as 
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revolutionary or exceptional when compared to other European states, has been greatly 
strengthened by recent pathbreaking historical research. This has included work on the 
contemporary laws of war by Isabel Hull,
18
 a monumental biography of Kaiser Wilhelm II by 
Joh Röhl, and a valuable military biography of Moltke as chief of staff by Annika Mombauer, 
works which between them provide strong evidence for a German government intention for 
war in 1914.
19
 After several decades of near-adulation by military historians (notably in the 
United States) of the German Army of 1870-1945, both recognition of its shortcomings and 
criticism of its warfighting methods are now growing. This includes increasing acceptance of 
the fact of German Army war crimes in Belgium in 1914 and later. Information is also 
starting to emerge as to the extent of Russian Army war crimes against German civilians in 
East Prussia in August 1914; and Austro-Hungarian Army war crimes against Russian and 
Serbian civilians.
20
 In 1914 the commencement of hostilities by almost all European armies, 
including the Ottoman forces in November, was accompanied within a very short time-frame 
by an accompanying large-scale massacre of civilians; the exceptions to this general rule 
being the French and the British. 
Just as it took decades for the post-Fischer consensus to emerge among historians, so 
it will take an equivalent time for the new challenges made to it to be evaluated. One 
approach, championed in part by Holger Afflerbach and by Michael Neiberg, marks a return 
to a more structural explanation, with the idea that war was seen as becoming less and not 
more likely as every crisis before July 1914 was successfully resolved.
21
 But if the structural 
idea of an inevitable war appealed as a historical model to 1960s theorists wrestling with the 
possibility of nuclear war, so this belief that the crisis of July 1914 could also have been 
defused and the old order preserved has somewhat derived from the peaceful ending to the 
cold war in the 1990s, and the forming of the European Union. But unlike the earlier 
structural approach, this view still places responsibility for the war on small numbers of 
highly-placed political decision-makers, rather than on large and impersonal social forces or 
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on a groundswell of popular opinion demanding war. This approach also does not conflict 
with the idea that the political and military leaders of Germany actively sought war in July 
1914, or at the very least that they were irresponsible in ignoring the obvious likelihood that a 
European-wide war would result from their behaviour. By asking if the actual historical 
outcome of July-August 1914 was itself improbable, this argument has also raised a matter 
with which many historians remain very uncomfortable: the role of chance or random events 
in history, and the present interest among some historians in whether counterfactual history 
has a serious role in historical studies.
22
 
 
VII. New (and Revived) Theories 
There are few historians who take seriously the German propaganda position of July-August 
1914 that Great Britain was responsible for starting the war; but one of the most valuable 
examples of a good controversy has recently been generated by the British naval historian 
Nicholas Lambert, in his book Planning Armageddon.
23
 Taking its narrative well into 1915, 
this book argues that the British had planned in some detail to take advantage of changes in 
international finance and shipping in the event of war, to destabilise and collapse German 
finances in a matter of weeks through naval ‘economic warfare’ restricting trade, and so win 
a short war chiefly by naval power, with the despatch of the British Expeditionary Force as a 
secondary and almost irrelevant matter. It is further argued that this ambitious British plan 
backfired when it was implemented in August 1914, proving so successful that it nearly 
destabilised the British, American and global trading financial structure as well, and had to be 
abandoned in favour of a more conventional ‘blockade’ (the British never declared a 
blockade of Germany in the legal sense).  
Lambert’s thesis is valuable for highlighting the several different historians’ 
perspectives that presently exist on the same events: the naval historians’ account of the 
blockade; the social, economic and cultural historians’ account of the impact of the blockade 
on Germany; and the political and military historians’ account of the relationship between the 
blockade and the defeat of the German Army in the West in 1918; all overlaid with the 
considerable propaganda programmes on all sides, which still remain largely neglected areas 
for research. It is probably beyond the scope of any one historian to possess expert 
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knowledge of all these fields, which strongly suggests the need for a unified approach. It is 
also significant that Lambert has argued that the British failure to create a unified ministry or 
political institution to direct this form of economic warfare, together with a corresponding 
failure to create an institutional memory and official history or record, led to its being 
neglected until his own re-discovery of its importance. The same argument could be made for 
British propaganda, which together with the naval blockade were held by the German stab-in-
the-back myth (Dolchstosslegende) to have been the two decisive (and illegal or immoral) 
Allied weapons. Again, this suggests the need for a unified and comparative approach. It may 
also be observed in passing that, although the land warfare and the naval warfare of the First 
World War has been increasingly understood in these much wider contexts, the history of air 
warfare, an almost entirely new form of manufacture and technology developed during the 
war, although it has attracted the attention of historians interested in its mythology and 
fictional representation, otherwise remains stuck in an apparently endless repetition of the 
war of the ‘Aces’ and the story of Baron von Richthofen.  
The gaps and problems already noted in the historical record of the Russian Empire 
and the Ottoman Empire have also prompted for the centenary a revival and re-examination 
of possible culpability for the outbreak of the First World War. Sean McMeekin has placed 
responsibility squarely on the Russian Empire, or more exactly on its foreign minister Sergei 
Sazanov. McMeekin’s thesis is that for more than a century before 1914 France and Great 
Britain were the two greatest opponents of Russian expansion, but that the diplomatic 
revolution of 1902-7 presented Russia with a historic opportunity in July 1914 to provoke a 
European war, in which France and Britain would fight Germany, leaving Russia with its best 
chance for an expansionist war against the Ottoman Empire which broke out in November, 
with the object of securing Constantinople and other territory.
24
 Although this account 
continues up to the Russian revolution, in a second book McMeekin follows only the day-by-
day crisis of July 1914, and concludes dramatically that not only were the Russians’ chiefly 
to blame, but that the German political and military high command fell ‘kicking and 
screaming’ into an Austrian trap that pulled them into the war.25 All recent accounts of the 
July-August crisis have stressed the incoherence and unreality of Austro-Hungarian decision-
making.  
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The book that has provoked the most popular interest for the commemoration of the 
outbreak of the war, and a very interesting challenge to the post-Fischer consensus, has been 
Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers (Die Schlafwandler), which has become a particular 
bestseller in Germany and also in Austria.
26
 In a stimulating argument, Clark has gone back 
to the structural position of the 1920s and 1930s: that no country’s government was without 
fault, and that therefore a moral equivalence and shared responsibility may be attributed to 
them all. The effect of this revived argument is actually to shift blame away from Berlin, 
emphasising the brutality and instability of the Serbian state in 1914, the incoherence of 
Austria-Hungary, the close links between France and Russia, and the ambiguous position of 
Great Britain, leaving the higher rulers of Germany as only one group of error-makers among 
many. Clark explains his title on his last page, stating with disarming honesty that his thesis 
cannot explain the decisions for war in rational terms, suggesting that ‘they knew it, but did 
they really feel it?’ and that ‘the protagonists of 1914 were sleepwalkers, watchful but 
unseeing’.27 Putting aside these metaphysical musing, it is a well-known principle that if a 
theory cannot explain the evidence, then it is not the evidence that is at fault. It has already 
been suggested that Clark’s thesis is ‘brilliant but flawed’, and that in reviving the idea that 
all sides were to blame for the outbreak of the war he has not just returned to a previously 
discarded theory, but actually disregarded the considerable body of evidence that has led to 
its being abandoned.
28
 What is much more disturbing, in terms of cultures of remembrance, is 
that the immense popularity in Germany and Austria of this revival of the structural approach 
of no-one being to blame suggests a continuing need for the present-day people of those 
countries to be personally absolved for responsibility for an event with which they have no 
actual connection, and which their commemorative culture has badly misunderstood. The 
handful of (mostly) men who made the decision for war in July-August 1914 are long dead, 
and the war that they began was not – in itself and automatically – the catastrophe that was 
shortly to become the Great War of 1914-1918. 
 
VIII. Conclusion  
Within months of the war’s outbreak, it became evident that the major powers had to do two 
things: to outfight their enemies but also to outlast them, hence the intimate connection 
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between their armed forces and their home societies in prosecuting the war. Historians now 
use the term ‘re-mobilisation’ to describe the successive processes whereby the German, 
French, British and even Russian governments sought to direct their industry and populations 
to continue the war. The essential components of fighting power, matériel and firepower on 
one side, morale and societal cohesion on the other, were complementary rather than as 
separate. For all major powers, the crisis year came in 1917, and by the end of that year the 
armies and navies that had not mutinied and the countries that had not collapsed into revolt or 
revolution had all shown remarkable resilience. In addition to the collapse of Imperial Russia, 
there were significant mutinies in the French, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman armies, and in 
the German Imperial Navy. The extent of the collapse of the German Army in 1918 is a 
matter for some debate, paradoxically because the scale of that collapse meant that its 
documentary records are so poor. All of these matters will continue to be the subjects for 
historical investigation, and proposed new theories and revisionism, as the anniversary years 
of the First World War continue through to the end of 2018 and beyond. Recent research is 
only just starting to answer the questions posed (sometimes rhetorically) by cultural 
historians in the 1970s: just how the mass of people in all belligerent countries fought, 
endured and perceived the war. It was previously a cliché that the experience of combat 
alienated soldiers from civilians, that no-one who had not been a Frontkampfer could have 
any notion of what they had endured. While this was certainly literally true of the First World 
War, as of all other wars, recent research has stressed the extent to which serving soldiers 
took their civilian culture with them to war, and the degrees to which their political and 
military leaders recognised and responded to this.
29
 One recent finding which remains 
controversial, even though the evidence for it appears presently overwhelming and is getting 
stronger, is that by the middle of the war, the average British civilian, letter-writing, 
newspaper-reading and cinema going, with a friend or relative serving in the armed forces, 
had a quite realistic understanding of the nature of the fighting fronts, including the levels of 
casualties, and yet still broadly supported fighting the war through to a victory. The same 
may yet be possibly said, with qualifications, of the German or French home fronts, although 
the levels of state censorship and misleading propaganda appear to have been 
correspondingly higher. From a distance of a hundred years, this is so very hard for us to 
understand that some historians have simply rejected or refused to come to terms with it. 
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Such evidence warns us that, although we appear to know so much about them, in our 
continuing study of the First World War we are dealing with societies utterly unlike our own. 
 
